
Model United Nations A/8/L.3



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Production, transportation and storage of fissile materials¹

The General Assembly,

Guided by the Conference on Disarmament (CD),

Aware of that fissile materials could be used in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),

Fully aware of the need to further develop restrictions and guidelines in the management of such materials,

Bearing in mind the need to further acquire means to produce electrical power, in order to satisfy the estimated growth in energy demand,

Deeply concerned that several states will experience exponential growth in energy demand in the near future,

Recalling that as of 2011 global stocks are believed to be 1440 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 495 of separated plutonium,

Convinced that nuclear energy represents the best option as it is highly effective relative to the amount of fuel spent,

Further recalling the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) who's intention is to prevent the spreading of nuclear WMDs, as well as promoting safe nuclear energy cooperation and general disarmament,

Expresses its appreciation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its work to pursue peaceful nuclear cooperation by sharing information and techniques to assure a safer environment, as well as creating frameworks and perform inspections to prevent accidents,

Noting with satisfaction that the transport of nuclear material is being treated with the required respect, as there has since 1971 been shipped more than 20.000 shipments, and even though there have been accidents, there have never been an emission of highly radioactive material from any of the containers,

¹ Resolution adopted by AASMUN from RRSIMUN General Assembly 2013, Croydon, United Kingdom

Approving of programs like the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) that monitor cargo at harbors and airports as well as performing gamma radiation scans to identify dangerous radioactive substances.

Fully aware that the elimination of the fissile materials is not easy and needs to be dealt with by step by step solutions,

Keeping in mind the importance of a safe location to store the fissile materials, and the nuclear waste created after the fission, that is unavailable from terrorist as well as being at a safe distance from the groundwater,

- 1. *Calls upon* Member States to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order for the international community to collectively work together, and to ratify the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) with the aim of peaceful nuclear cooperation;
- 2. *Encourages* all states to implement the equivalents of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI), that will be developed by the IAEA, together with representatives from the member states and the international community, in order to assure that nuclear materials are not illegally transported out of the state;
- 3. *Recommends* that the responsibility of the IAEA is extended, by establishing another department sponsored by the increased revenue from membership fees, to include:
 - (a) Monitoring of the production at the nuclear plants to a greater extent,
- (b) Assigning neutral observers to assure that the new program mentioned in operative clause 2 is properly executed,
- (c) Exploring the opportunities for establishing safe deposit-locations for nuclear waste,
- (d) A biannual meeting to evaluate the need for further extensions of its range of responsibility;
- 4. *Proposes* that the only fuel that will be accepted for use in a nuclear reactor, is in the form of:
 - (a) Uranium-235 with less than 20 % refinement (low enriched uranium),
- (b) Plutonium-239 with more than 7 % Plutonium-240 (fuel and reactor grade plutonium),
- (c) Possible use of Thorium-232 if the technology advances to the point where it would be necessary;

- 5. Supports the further development of more advanced containers, in order to assure safe transportation and storage of nuclear materials also by implementing the following standards throughout transportation and storage of fissile materials, *inter alia*:
- (a) Using regulatory controls such as labeling, placarding, quality assurance and maintenance records,
- (b) Controlling all parties in the processes of production, transport and storage,
- (c) Establishing harsh punishments under national law to deter the illegal interruption or interference with these processes;
- 6. Further suggests that the transport of these materials, due to security issues, should be transported by train or maritime vessels, developed specifically for the purpose of transporting hazardous materials, instead of aviation as this represents a greater threat to the environment in case of an accident;
- 7. Requests an international law that prohibits any new nuclear reactor from initiating any form of production before it has been awarded with a QHSE-certificate (Quality, Health, Safety, Environment) from the IAEA, in order to minimize the risks, and existing reactors will have to acquire this QHSE-certificate before the end of 2018 in order to continue with a safe and sustainable nuclear energy production;
- 8. *Urges* the IAEA, together with military advisors from the Member States, to create a report on the security risks, posed by the different nuclear reactors, and further develop a set of guidelines on how to sufficiently maintain a high level of security in case of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other extraordinary events;
- 9. Further recommends that the locations for the nuclear waste management are set to abandoned mines, where the possibility of polluting the ground water or the threat of a terrorist attack is bearable;
- 10. *Expresses its hope* that countries will continue to investigate different methods of nuclear waste disposal, especially by cooperation across borders.